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Preface 
This report focuses exclusively on institutional credit, but does not intend to underplay 
the increasing importance of nonformal agricultural credit. Although data do not exist 
on the magnitude of informal lending, there is no doubt that institutional credit remains 
a step-child of non-institutional (informal) credit in Bangladesh agriculture. Two 
excellent sources of information about the informal sector are documents by Clarence 
Maloney and by Therese Blanchet. 
This report is essentially a distillation of data and ideas culled from the many reports of 
Robert R. Nathan Associates and The Ohio State University. Their work was funded 
by the USAID/ Bangladesh Rural Finance Project. In particular, I would like to ack-
nowledge the assistance I received from Dr. Zia Ahmed, Dr. Richard Meyer, and Dr. 
Forrest Cookson. Very little contained in this paper will be surprising to those whom 
I just mentioned and to those who work in the senior ranks of the Bangladesh banking 
sector. However, any errors or omissions remain fully mine. 
The impetus for this paper came from Dr. Tom Daves, Chief of Party for the IBRD 
Agricultural Sector Assessment Team. He insisted that agricultural credit be emphasized 
in their analysis. An earlier version of this paper was submitted to the IBRD while I 
was on loan to the Sector Team. 
Since August 1987 when this paper was initially drafted, the Government of Bangladesh 
(GOB) has had to cope with very bad flooding and political unrest leading up to another 
Parliamentary election. Unfortunately for the viabilitiy of the financial institutions and 
the general health of the agricultural economy, a major casualty of these disturbances has 
been institutional credit. Essentially, the progress toward financial viability of the 
banking system made during FY87 was at least partially negated in FY88. Bangladesh 
continues to use the banking system as a mechanism of social welfare. Ironically (but 
not surprisingly), it remains the relatively wealthy and influential who are able to access 
and qualify for most of the credit. 
I hope that this report will not only encourage people to refer to the more specific 
literature on agricultural credit cited in this report, but also to effect an improvement of 
the credit system so as to promote increased agri·cultural growth. 
An initial draft of this paper was written while I was on loan from USAID/Bangladesh 
to an IBRD Agricultural Sector Assessment team in Bangladesh. 
The views presented are my own and may not necessarily be shared by AID, Bangladeshi 
institutions, or The Ohio State University. 
R.E.N. 
August 1988 
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INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT IN BANGLADESH AGRICULTURE 
I. Overview of the Current Situation 
1.01 The Bangladesh banking system in FY87 succeeded in increasing the recovery rate 
of overdue loans in FY87, but fell far short of its longer term goal of restoring discipline 
in financial markets. Foremost among the changes in agricultural credit was the 
President's belated crop loan recovery program that permitted remission of interest 
payments on small loans. Also, the Rural Finance Project (USAID /Bangladesh Bank) 
collected some excellent data and offered some insightful recommendations. While it is 
encouraging that the GOB has finally taken some measures commensurate with the 
magnitude of the problem with loan recoveries (ergo the financial viability of the banking 
system), the challenge remains to institutionalize the short-term reforms so that they 
become standard operating procedures. A revised goal might be to eliminate the need 
for crash programs that often either crash themselves, or cause numerous unplanned 
negative consequences. For example, recovery drives must avoid causing a liquidity crisis 
and harming rural productivity. 
1.02 During FY88, a number of factors have overturned some of the progress made 
during FY87. Responding to the worst flooding in many decades and the need for 
political calm before the Parliamentary elections, the GOB once again encouraged the 
banking community to expand the number of agricultural loans and relax the repayment 
schedules of many outstanding loans. The extent and net effect that these GOB-inspired 
reschedulings and interest forgiveness actions have had on the banking industry is not 
clear as of this writing. Such actions in and of themselves do not constitute poor 
banking practice if they were administered on an as needed, case by case basis, to those 
individuals who truly could not pay back their loans due to the floods. Instead, 
indications are that once again the GOB has interfered with good banking practices, and 
thus interrupted the process of gradually making the banking system viable financially in 
the medium and long term. 
1.03 Until FY86, the GOB had been following a policy of directed lending to priority 
sectors and activities, low interest refinancing from the Central Bank (raised in October 
1983), and a lack of emphasis on loan recovery. Agricultural credit went through a 
remarkable expansionary period from the late 1970's to the mid 1980's. As a percentage 
of total outstanding advances (a "stock" as opposed to disbursements that are a "flow"), 
the agricultural sector received 27 percent in FY86. In FY78, this figure was only 10.5 
percent (the manufacturing and wholesale/retail sectors were of course the largest 
recipients during this period). Bank outstanding advances to agriculture as a percentage 
of agricultural GDP were 11.3 percent in FY86, up from 2 percent in FY78. The impetus 
for this expansion was a three-fold increase in branch banks, occurring principally in the 
period 1977-1981, followed by a period of expansion of agricultural credit disbursements 
during 1983-1985. This expansion took place so rapidly that the branch banks and 
cooperatives did not properly screen the borrowers, with the result that dismally low 
rates of loan recoveries now jeopardize the entire banking system and will continue to 
do so. The President's personal program in FY87 of interest forgiveness on the 
repayment of crop loans, as opposed to term loans, succeeded in increasing recoveries 
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among the poorer segments of the population, but his program did not even attempt to 
address the problem of large loans that are overdue in the agricultural sector, nor the 
even poorer recovery performance in the industrial sector. Until a way can be found to 
deal with those politically and financially well connected people who have not repaid 
these large loans, the survival of the banking system will depend on a life support system 
of GOB interest subsidies and loan guarantees. 
1.04 An acute awareness of this situation was expressed by the Minister of Finance in 
his June 1988 Annual Budget speech. He stated that the "position of overdue industrial 
credit is extremely unsatisfactory," and that efforts to recover overdues will "continue 
unabated." Such rhetoric must be translated into implementation via the political as well 
as the banking systems if the viability of self-sustaining agricultural credit is to be ever 
to be achieved. Also, although the down-tum in disbursements during the past three 
years does not seems to have had a profound effect on agriculture in the short run, it 
may constitute a time-bomb due to the lack of investments in the future growth of the 
agricultural sector (irrigation and fldod control systems, for example). 
' 
' 
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II. Summaa of Recommendations 
2.01 Rural Branch Expansion- Expansion should continue at the slow rate of the past 
two years, with decisions to establish branches left to the individual banks. The 
importance of long-term solvency of the banks has not received the attention that it 
needs. On the other hand, it must be balanced with the social desirability of an 
expansion into the remaining 50 percent of unions that do not have formal banking 
institutions, and the importance of promoting competition among banking institutions. 
Private banking in rural areas should be encouraged, and the Lead Bank in each Upazila 
should be changed periodically in keeping with the most active bank in each Upazila. 
The number and location of branch banks and informal credit institutions needs to be 
reviewed after completion of the proposed IBRD/GOB study of the cooperative system. 
2.02 Liquidity in Rural Areas- The GOB should regularly consider the combined effects 
of monetary policy, programs to recover overdue loans, and expected profits based on 
prices and crop yields so as to maintain an even expansion of the rural economy. The 
GOB is now generally able to fend off famine that results from periodic natural calamity. 
The GOB should focus more attention on improving crop forecasts and the decision-mak-
ing process surrounding foodgrain imports so that the foodgrain import levels neither fail 
to combat famine, nor re-create cyclical disincentives on domestic production. The 
management of overall liquidity must be part of this process. 
2.03 Recoveries- Now that small crop loans have been successfully recovered from the 
poorer members of society, the GOB must next encourage the banks to collect term 
loans in rural sectors. Strong sanctions need to be employed against those who are now 
clearly recalcitrant. Simultaneously, the longer term proposition of educating people about 
the importance of financially viable financial institutions must be started through political 
and non-bureaucratic structures. The banks should accelerate their in-house training 
programs on loan recovery techniques, and change accounting systems and reporting 
requirements to reflect a common definition of recovery. The GOB must avoid the 
necessity for crash programs of interest foregiveness. These have a negative impact on 
bank viability. 
2.04 Disbursements- The Passbook System should be continued, but its integrity must 
be protected. Passbooks should be numbered, extracts of land records should be included 
in them, and Union Parishad Chairmen should no longer have a say in their allocation, 
unless they are personally going to guarantee the creditworthiness of the individuals. 
2.05 Savin&s Mobilization- The banking system should improve borrower selection, loan 
recovery, and general intermediation (see definition in Section 5.15). New marketing and 
banking techniques for mobilizing deposits should be explored. Also, the National Savings 
Schemes should be transferred from the National Savings Directorate to the Bangladesh 
Bank. If these steps are taken, then savings mobilization can proceed in a steady, less 
disrupting, and more sustainable fashion than would be the case if the GOB were to 
just launch a savings mobilization campaign. 
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' 2.06 Interest Rates- They should be allowed to increase in accordance with supply and 
demand considerations. The current 6% penalty on late payments should be incorporated 
into a revised, all inclusive interest rate for new loans, perhaps as a fee, and returned 
as a rebate to those borrowers who repay on time. Because a direct implementation of 
this recommendation is not politically feasible at this time, the GOB should explore ways 
of hiding effective increases through various techniques of marketing a loan. For example, 
instead of announcing that the rate of interest is 16 percent per annum, it could be sold 
as 10 percent per crop cycle. 
2.07 Cro,p Insurance- Work should continue to specify the objectives and implement the 
Rural Credit Guarentee Fund. 
2.08 Responsiveness to Client Needs- Banks should continue to experiment with and 
adapt four approaches to lending- supervised, tied, targeted, and group lending. But 
donors and indigenous NGOs should try to limit (if not eliminate) the number of 
targeted programs, which cause inefficiencies in the overall operation of agricultural 
lending. The banker/ client relationship should be improved. Greater collaborative work 
will improve the ''bank-ability" of the borrower, and thus strengthen the banking system. 
With greater understanding of farmers' situations, bankers will be better able to screen 
out risky loans, as well as to selectively reschedule loans of those who truly have 
encountered an unexpected calamity. Also, perhaps NGOs and public agencies such as 
the BRDB could be more active in forming and preparing "bankable" groups. 
2.09 l&&al System- Banks should be allowed to select their own counsel in Certificate 
cases. District Magistrates should be authorized to appoint temporary servers and clerks 
to handle the certificate case-load. Other constraints to the increased use of the 
Certificate procedure should be removed as outlined in numerous evaluations. 
2.10 Accountin& Procedures- Further adjustment is needed of regulations with respect 
to loan classfication, eligibility of accrued interest as current income, and the provision 
of bad debt allowances at the head office, with the objectives of having the accounts 
reflect the true economic condition of the bank. 
2.11 "Mana~ment b,y Directive"- The Bangladesh Bank should renew its efforts to 
gather political support for its directives so that they have greater acceptance when 
received. Also, the GOB should reconsider the negative impact of rapid tum-over of the 
bank directors. 
2.12 Bl(B. BSBL and the BRDB Cooperatives- Further reorganization of the BKB into 
four regional branches should await the results of the implementation of other reforms 
mentioned in this and other reports. The Joint Review of the Cooperative System in 
Bangladesh should be given high priority by the GOB. 
2.13 General Administration of Rural Branches- Rules and regulations should be 
changed to enhance the incentives of bank officers to mobilize savings, increase 
recoveries, and operate more efficiently. While computers could be introduced into rural 
' • 
• 
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banking to improve reporting and record-keeping, they should not preceed a steady 
supply of electricity and the development of appropriate accounting software. 
2.14 Institutional Health- Arrangements need to be made to write-off bad debts and 
prepare for a new start. Current records of known defaulters should be exchanged among 
financial institutions. Reforms should be instituted that will help avoid past mistakes. The 
GOB, having decided to have banks serve as banks, and not arms of political patronage 
or social welfare, should then, and only then, approach the donor community with a 
request for assistance in re-capitalizing the banks. 
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III. History. Attitudes. and Credit Needs in the Future 
Histozy (Ahmed 1987, pp. 1-6; Alim 1982, pp. 17-23) 
3.01 Since ancient times, moneylenders have been prime sources of credit. In the part 
of the world now defined by Bangladesh, the zamindars followed the Moghul lords in 
controlling money lending during feudal times. These zamindars, along with Hindu 
businessmen and Muslim "Kabuliwalas" from the Frontier Provinces of India, were often 
accused of charging usurious interest rates. The British interceded in 1935 and helped 
establish the Banking Act of 1936 and the Debit Reconciliation Boards that provided 
some relief to loanees by trying all moneylending cases. Another form of relief provided 
by the British Government began in the 1880's. The state provided "Taccavi" loans to 
farmers, generally after disasters so that they could resume productive activities. These 
loans were generally viewed as grants from the government. 
3.02 In 1904, the Cooperative Credit Societies Act was introduced in part to curb the 
perceived tyranny of the money lender. The Cooperative societies were formed right 
down to the village level. For a number of reasons, these early cooperatives did not 
prosper. First, the net flow of funds tended to go from the village to the central 
committee. Second, recommendations in a report from the Reserve Bank of India in 
1937 as to how to collect overdue cooperative loans were ignored. Third, the Cooperative 
Societies Law of 1940 (Bengal Act XXI) and its implementation rules of 1942 did not 
prohibit the granting of loans to members of the management committee, nor the 
granting of new loans to willful defaulters. Accumulated outstanding overdues of the 
Cooperative Bank from 1958 to 1971 were 220 million Taka, one third of the total 
amount loaned. After Independence, the East Pakistan Provincial Cooperative Bank 
became the Bangladesh Samabaya Bank Limited (BSBL). 
3.03 In 1952, the Agricultural Development Finance Cooperative was formed mainly to 
serve large farmers. In 1958, this became the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan 
(ADBP) with a mandate to also serve small farmers. Given that a land title was 
required as collateral for a loan, ADBP did not serve the needs of rural poor very well. 
Also, its purpose was primarily to mobilize rural deposits for investment in urban 
enterprises by opening branches in major towns. 
3.04 Started in Camilla in the 1960's by Aktar Hamid Khan, the Integrated Rural 
Development Programme (IRDP) set up a grass roots, supervised agricultural credit 
program which proved very successful. In the 20 Thanas (sub-districts) ip which this 
program functioned between 1968-70, the default rate was only 8.1 percent on 33 million 
Taka. Many of these cooperatives collapsed after the departure of the charismatic Khan, 
and Bangladesh has been unable to replicate the system. 
3.05 Before Independence, there were 12 Pakistani (10 commercial, the ADBP, and the 
FDBP), 2 Bengali commercial, and 8 foreign banks operating a total of 1,191 branches 
in present-day Bangladesh. The 1971 War and the Awami League's policy of 
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nationalization hurt the banking system in terms of both liquidity and managerial talent. 
The State Bank of Pakistan in Bangladesh became the Bangladesh Bank (BB). The 6 
newly formed nationalized commercial banks (NCBs) replaced the 12 commercial banks 
excepting the foreign banks. Two specialized banks, the BKB and Bangladesh Samabaya 
Bank, Ltd. (BSBL), replaced the ADBP and FDBP, respectively. 
3.06 All banks, including the BB, were viewed as a means of reallocating resources 
among various classes and regions, and among economic activities established for the 
social good of the nation. Despite explicit instructions from the Bangladesh Government 
(GOB) and the availability of refinance from the BB at 2 to 4 1/2 percent below the 
bank rate from the BB, the NCBs and the BKB remained reluctant to extend agricultural 
credit due to the perceived high costs and low returns. In fact, the share of agriculture 
in total advances increased from only 8.4 percent in 1970 to 8.9 percent in 1976. It was 
also widely believed that the net flow of funds was out of rural areas. This poor 
performance of the nationalized banks to reach social objectives, set the stage for more 
active GOB involvement in banking. 
3.07 In 1977, a new President launched the Taka 100 Crore Special Agricultural Credit 
Program (SACP). The purpose was to increase rural credit from the NCJls and BKB so 
as to meet food self-sufficiency. The NCBs were ·forced to open 2 rural branches for 
each new urban branch, and the GOB provided a guarantee on loans from these banks. 
The program simplified loan procedures including hypothecation ( eg. the use of the 
future harvest as collateral on a loan) so that land did not have to be used as collateral. 
The borrowers were selected by the Union Agricultural Credit Committees (UACCs) 
headed by the Union Parishad Chairman. Since these committee members were not 
required to guarantee the loans of the people they recommended, there was much abuse 
of the system. In order to address some of these problems, the Cooperative Societies 
Ordinance was passed in 1984. Although this law has many shortcomings, it does contain 
some stiff provisions. For example, loan defaulters are no longer permitted to hold 
office in the UACCs or in the cooperatives. The enforcement of this regulation, 
however, may be difficult. 
3.08 In 1984, the SACP rules were changed so that credit could be provided based on 
a farmer's total farming system needs, rather than on just the requirements of individual 
crops. The GOB loan guarantee was also dropped. A "passbook system" was initiated to 
prevent people from obtaining multiple loans for the same purpose. In 1987, the GOB 
offered to waive interest payments on crop loans under 10,000 TK if paid before June 
7, 1987 in an effort to improve the recovery rate. Also, the Parliament amended the 1913 
Public Demand Recovery Act in July 1987. This Act allows banks to make public the 
fact that public office holders are delinquent in their payments, and it bars those with 
such debts from holding elected office. As of June 1988, there were 4 NCBs, 8 domestic 
private banks, 7 foreign banks, 2 Specialized Development Banks (BKB, and the BSB for 
industrial loans), and the cooperative banks under BSBL. The Development Finance 
Institutions (DFis) are the Bangladesh Shipla Bank (BSB) and the Bangladesh Shilpa 
Rin Sangstha (BSRS) that lend primarily to industry. 
8 
Attitudes Towards Credit Today 
3.09 In general, old attitudes towards credit still prevail today; a loan is the result of 
patronage, and does not necessarily have to be repaid. This is especially true in the case 
of loans from the government, which are viewed as grants originating from foreign donors 
who, by definition, do not expect the grants to be repaid. The current government 
continues to lend credence to this attitude. In the aftermath of flooding in 1984, the 
government said that the crop loans among those who lost their crops did not have to 
be repaid. This is similar to the "Taccavi" loans mentioned above. In April 1987, the 
government decided to forgive overdue interest on outstanding loans to weavers in the 
handloom industry, and explore the possibility of a reduced rate of interest on new 
credit. Thus, not only are borrowers currently skeptical about the necessity to repay 
loans, but so is the government. 
3.10 In fact, many high ranking government officials believe that by tolerating defaults, 
particular groups or individuals can be helped in an innocuous way. During the August 
1987 floods, the President ordered the banks to extend agricultural credit to the affected 
farmers. But whereas in the past the GOB forgave the loans. this time the GOB only 
rescheduled them. This was a positive step in keeping with the advice of USAID's Rural 
Finance Project (RFP). The RFP has been trying to communicate, among other messages, 
that persistent defaults cause financial intermediaries to be perceived as transitory rather 
than permanent. As a result, borrowers will not repay their current loans because they 
cannot count on future loans, and savers will not trust the banks as safe places to store 
money. 
Credit Needs in the Future 
3.11 Agriculture provides 46 percent of the GDP and 80 percent of the jobs in 
Bangladesh. With an industrial sector still in its infancy, the agricultural sector must 
remain the engine of economic development. Unlike Indonesia or Thailand where under-
-utilized lands remain available for cultivation, Bangladesh is limited to essentially 
improving the intensity of cultivation on currently under-cultivated land. The use of 
additional units of labor are necessary but not sufficient to meet the challenge. More 
irrigation, improved seed varieties, and better farming techniques are also required. 
Capital investment in the form of agricultural credit must be available in larger amounts. 
This is particularly true because of the lack of privately held savings that could otherwise 
be used (irrigated agriculture in the Punjab expanded rapidly due in part to the use of 
privately held savings). 
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IV. Indicators and Trends 
Institutional vs. Non-Institutional Credit 
4.01 For the purposes of this paper, we will use the following terminology: ''Institutional" 
sources of credit range from formal banks to cooperatives and the Grameen Bank. 
''Non-institutional" sources (sometimes referred to as "informal" sources) include relatives, 
neighbors, landlords, merchants, and money lenders ("mohazon"). 
4.02 During the 1980's, it seems that the role of institutional credit in funding 
agriculture has been decreasing vis-a-vis non-institutional credit. In FY 1982, the 
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies conducted a study in collaboration with 
IFPRI which showed that only 12.5 percent of farmers borrowed from institutional 
sources and that the average amounts borrowed were Tk. 382 per household and 373 per 
hectare. The interest paid on these loans was on the average Tk. 60 per hectare, and 
about 0.6 percent of the gross value of production. Regular data collection by the 
International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC) shows that only about 8 percent 
comes from formal institutions (IFPRI/BIDS 1985). Thus less than 1 percent of all 
farmers purchased fertilizer using credit from formal institutions during FY87. The use 
of institutional credit to finance irrigation equipment has also become alarmingly low 
during the past two years as the table below illustrates: 
Table 1. Bank Loans Supporting BADC STW Sales 
Of Which Through 
Year Total Sales Bank Credit Percent 
FY84 6988 6612 95 
FY85 7678 6890 90 
FY86 2045 654. 32 
·pys7 659 230 35 
(up to Feb.) 
Source: IBRD/Bangladesh Office Memorandum dated 4/25/87. 
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"Non-institutional" loans tend to be based on an intricate network of reciprocal 
relationships, allowing repayment both in cash and in kind. Recent studies have shown 
that women have relied heavily on non-institutional credit due to their particular 
difficulties with both formal and informal institutions. "Informal institutions," such as the 
Grameen Bank, recognize the potential of giving credit to women and are beginning to 
address it. In the meantime, "non-institutional" sources of credit remain attractive 
because they have low transaction costs, no queues, no forms to fill out, and no bribes 
of 3-10% to pay. Also, the loans seldom require land as collateral. The disadvantages 
of non-institutional sources include: interest rates that often exceed 120% per year; no 
supervision along with the loan; and, in case of a genuine crop failure, the loan will not 
be 'written off.' Institutional credit at least attempts to address these lacunae. 
Direction of Credit Flow 
4.03 The Chittagong region, both urban and rural, is the major supplier of funds to 
other regions. Urban Dhaka is the next largest source of funds with the highest amount 
of deposits in the country. Rural Rajshabi and Khulna have become major recipients of 
funds since 1983, followed by rural Dhaka. Since 1983, the ratio of advances to deposits 
in rural areas has been positive, but it bas been steadily declining since1985. As of 1987, 
the ratio of advances to deposits was 1.1 (presentation by Cookson in May 1988). 
Uses of A&ricultural Loans 
4.04 Some reports indicate that only about 50 percent . of so-called agricultural credit 
is distributed to farmers. The other 50 percent is funneled to tea planters, cold storage 
owners, fish pond operators, and to industries related to agriculture and marketing of 
agricultural commodities, especially jute and tobacco. Of those loans that reach farmers, 
only about 50 percent of the money is used for "productive" purposes. The remainder is 
used for social functions and obligations such as rights of passage. Thus only about 25 
percent of the total disbursed amount of agricultural loans is utilized specifically in 
agriculture (Alim 1982, pg.34 ). 
Individual Loan Size 
4.05 During the past five years, there has been a shift from small to large loans. In 
terms of the number of loans issued between FY80 and FY84, more than 50 percent of 
the loans were small, under Taka 2500, while 29 percent were categorized as medium 
and 13 percent as large (IFDC, 1987, pg.13). But in terms of the value of loans, only 12 
percent were small-sized loans, 18 percent were medium, and 70 percent were large. 
Overall, 69 percent of the loan volume was concentrated in large loans for overdrafts, 
installments, and other loans. Large loans in 1979 /80 accounted for 41 percent of total 
loan value. By 1984/84, these loans constituted 89 percent (Gregory and Adams 1986, 
pg. 10). 
4.06 Another example of the size of individual loans can be obtained from records of 
the BKB, which handled 58% of all agricultural loans during FY86. Loans larger than 
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10,000 Taka, with the average size being 55,000 Taka, constituted 44% of the total loan 
volume, but only 4% of all their borrowers received loans of this size. Also, the average 
rural account's outstanding balance (principal plus interest plus penalty) was Tk. 896 in 
FY75 and grew to Tk. 5250 in FY86. Some possible equity questions arising from this 
situation will be mentioned subsequently. 
Duration of Loans 
4.07 As of June 30, 1985, a rural branch bank's loan portfolio contained on average 
74 percent of agricultural loans of which 40 percent were short term, 20 percent medium 
term, and 14 percent long term. Only the Sonali Bank and BKB devoted at least a 
quarter of the total value of their portfolios to short-term agricultural loans, more 
commonly referred to as "crop loans." Crop loans tend to be for small amounts (less 
than Tk. 10,000), and their repayment rate is higher than for the so-called "term loans" 
that fund tube-wells and livestock, for example. Many donor projects include term loan 
components. Annex Table A shows that during the past few years there has been a shift 
from crop loans to term loans. This trend raises some concerns about equity and 
repayment, which the Special Agricultural Credit Program attempted to address in 1978 
at a time when the BKB's entire portfolio, for example, consisted of term loans (Cookson 
1986). 
The Number of Bank Branches 
4.08 The GOB has succeeded in encouraging rural branch expansion. At the start of 
the Special Agricultural Credit Program (SACP) in 1977, there were 2,047 bank branches, 
of which 1,094 were in rural areas. By the end of February 1987, there were 5,189 
branches, 3,472 of them located in rural areas as illustrated in Annex Table B (Ahmed 
1987). The number of rural branches by bank were as follows: BKB and the Sonali Bank 
about 900 branches each; the Janata and Agrani Banks about 540 each; the Rupali Bank 
274; and the private banks- Pubali and Uttara- together had about 257 (Lu 1986, pg.19). 
This phenomenal growth is due mostly to the BB policy of authorizing a new urban 
branch only when two rural branches were also opened. Rural branch banks have 
increased from 53% to 67% of all branches during this past decade. This increase has 
allowed greater accessibility of the rural population to the banking system, thus helping 
to monetize the rural economy (Ahmed, 1987, pg.6). 
4.09 The GOB should be lauded for the incredibly fast expansion of rural branch banks, 
but with some caveats. First, this growth has not been spread evenly in rural areas. Of 
the 4472 Unions in Bangladesh, over half still do not have formal banking facilities. 
Second, in theory, village based cooperatives (the Upazila Central Cooperative 
Association/ Krishak Samabay Samabay (UCCA/KSS)) fill this gap, but their 
performance has been reported as far from satisfactory (World Bank, 1983, pg.13), and 
there is some unnecessary overlap among banks and credit-giving cooperatives. Branch 
expansion should continue, but not at the expense of long term solvency. New branches 
should be licensed based on the dual objectives of reducing transaction costs to 
borrowers, while aiming towards an optimal scale of operation for the branches. This is 
not an easy trade-off to reconcile. Competition among formal banking institutions for 
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rural accounts should be promoted. Also, the command areas of the Lead Banlcs need 
to be restructured to improve management, because in some upazilas the Lead Bank is 
not always the most active bank (Ahmed, 1987, pg. 4). Fourth, the expansion in the 
numbers of branches increased the number of deposits via market penetration, but this 
only keeps the system appearing viable. With difficulty obtaining repayment of principle, 
banlcs may have to receive an infusion of cash from their central offices. We recommend 
that the GOB continue its current slow expansion of new bank branches, and give 
preference to increasing the number of Unions which are served by at least one branch. 
Mobile Bankin& 
4.10 One way of providing formal institutional banking to these unserved Unions is 
through mobile banking. The RFP studied the Cox's Bazaar area and came up with an 
IRR of 20.4% if the proposed mobil banking scheme was income tax exempt, and 12.5% 
if taxes were included. The RFP concluded that mobile banking is worth exploring on 
a pilot basis in a few easily identifiable locations. These areas should undergo marketing 
research to assess socio-economic characteristics and the accessability of the area to 
four-wheel drive vehicles (Nathan Vol. 3, 1986, pg. 74). Mobile banlcs may reduce not 
only the transaction costs of both banlcs and their clients, but may also help break down 
the barriers that prevent more women from traveling to and using formal banking 
institutions. We recommend that the BB facilitate credit to the NCB/BKB to test mobile 
banking on a pilot basis in a few purposively selected areas with one caveat: it should 
simultaneously test a lower cost option- that of using motorcycles and bicycles. 
Disbursements 
4.11 While the period of greatest growth of branch banks was from 1977-1981, the 
period of greatest expansion of agricultural credit disbursements was from 1983-1985 as 
illustrated in Annex Table C. Given the current high rate of overdues, it is easy to 
conclude that the doubling of annual agricultural disbursements from FY82 to FY84 far 
exceeded the absorptive capacity of both the institutions and the borrowers. We will 
leave it to the political historians to decide whether the harm this has caused the banking 
system is out-weighed by the gains achieved under Martial Law in providing political 
patronage through the banking system for the establishment of the Upazila system and 
the return to Parliamentary rule in 1987. 
4.12 Annex Table A shows the rapid growth in nominal disbursements from Tk. 1.1 
billion in FY77 to a high of Tk. 11.5 billion in FY85. In real terms, the growth had been 
a four-fold increase in just a five year period FY78-FY84 as shown in Table C. But since 
January of 1983, the number of new loans has declined by a factor of three through the 
first half of FY88. Three explanations can be offered: 1 ). The IMF mandated direct 
controls over credit disbursements in light of poor recovery rates; 2). The banks were 
losing money from agricultural loans due in large part to the almost total lack of political 
or legal support to help them recover loans; 3). There has been a slow-down in 
large-scale irrigation projects, and those that exist are notoriously bad in repaying their 
loans. 
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4.13 The ratio of agricultural disbursements to agricultural GDP also increased from 
0.8% in FY76 to almost 6% in FY84, and then slid to about 2.4% in both FY86 and 
FY87. Despite this significant increase, the availability of agricultural credit remains quite 
low compared with that of other countries, especially those whose agricultural sectors 
contribute as much as 46% of total GDP (Ahmed 1987, pg.8). Usually, capital to 
output ratios tend to be higher with more progressive agricultural systems, and when the 
share of GDP is lower. For example, the Philippines ratio got up to 25 percent and 
then fell. (Ahmed, 1987, pg. 8). 
Number of LQan Accounts 
4.14 The number of rural loan accounts grew from 30,000 in FY75 to 5.5 million in 
FY86, while the number of urban accounts only doubled. Now almost 85% of the total 
number of advance accounts (accounts that advance/loan/disburse money) are held in 
rural branches, although they represent only 27% of the total value of advances. Thus, 
the GOB has made only slight headway towards SACPs goal of providing rural areas 
with real access to more resources vis-a-vis urban areas. 
Bank Advances and Outstandin~ Balances 
4.15 Annex Table D shows that formal credit outstanding in rural areas increased more 
than 100 times, from Tk. 290 million in FY75 to about 33 billion in FY87, while urban 
credit grew only 9 times. As of FY86, outstanding credit to agriculture was 32% of all 
bank credit, up from only 11 % in FY77 (Ahmed, 1987, Table 2). As a percentage of 
agriculture GDP, outstanding credits have increased from 2.4% in FY77 to 14% in FY86. 
These figures on outstanding advances cannot give a complete picture about the general 
level of liquidity and access to credit in part because they include not only principal, but 
also interest due. 
Recoveries 
4.16 While the GOB took important preliminary steps toward restoring discipline in 
financial markets in late 1986, and initial results were very encouraging, there are 
indications that major problems remain. Despite magnanimous offers of amnesty on 
interest payments, recovery levels of overdue loans remain unacceptably high. As Dale 
Adams and Richard Meyer have noted, rampant loan delinquency and default can tear 
at the basic fiber of society by encouraging evasion of contracts. High rates of default 
essentially rob future borrowers of resources that the financial intermediaries would have 
provided (Meyer 1986, pg. 16; Gregory 1986 pg. 17). 
4.17 With the exception of a few specialized programs like that of the Grameen Bank, 
poor loan recoveries are a long-standing and seemingly endemic problem to the banking 
system in Bangladesh. The magnitude of the problem is difficult to quantify because of 
inconsistencies in definitions and reporting requirements. Branch banks and borrowers 
attach no particular significance to repayment on a due date. Typically, the branch banks 
keep track of outstanding loans, but not the dates that they are due (Lu 1986, pg. 5). As 
standard practice, many banks simply roll-over loans on their books, and accrued interest 
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is reported as income. Loan recovery figures, which include loans that have simply been 
rolled-over, lose much of their significance as a measure of the health of a banking 
system. The Bangladesh Bank, while not condoning late payments, made it quite 
attractive for a bank to use the refinance window with its low interest rates (increased 
as part of the USAID Rural Finance Project). 
4.18 In 1984, the ACD/BB introduced a loan recovery recording system known as 
"ACD-L (1-6)." These forms attempted to be "all things to all people." Thus they collect 
so much information that the BB has difficulty in processing the data in a timely fashion, 
even with a computer. This monitoring and information system needs to be reviewed to 
better handle the trade-off between the timeliness of data, and the amount of data 
(Nathan 1986, pg. 73). Also, additional effort is needed to discover what are the 
information requirements of decision-makers, and teach decision-makers what the data 
can show. Of course, better data does not lead to improved recovery rates until 
decision-makers enforce such a policy. Led by donors who provide large sums to the 
banking system, the GOB is beginning to seek out and use information about the 
performance of the banking system. 
4.19 Annex Table D shows the recovery rate of both interest and principal, defined as 
a percent of amount due, falling rapidly from 48.5% in FY82 to 25.6% in FY86. 
Preliminary estimates for FY87 indicate that the rate may have climbed to 40.6%, or 
slightly above the GOB target of 40%. This increase is a direct result of the President's 
interest remission program for borrowers who had overdue loans valued at less than Tk. 
10,000. The program lasted about six months, with the repayment period extended twice, 
ending finally on June 7, 1987. The recovery rate remains well below that of the early 
1980s as illustrated very well in graph form (Meyer and Srinivasan 1987, pg. 30). The 
extensions favored those people with political clout, for they either were not planning to 
repay, or they knew that the repayment date was likely to be extended. Thus they 
benefited from a few more months of free credit. Those who did repay were predomi-
nantly the poor who held small sized loans, some of whom resorted to asset depletion 
or loans from money-lenders to make the payments. 
4.20 There is no doubt that the program succeeded in collecting principal that otherwise 
might not have been repaid. Negatively, the program cost the banks, and ultimately the 
GOB, a great loss in interest payments. Also, the program has been criticized for 
perpetuating the belief that there are rewards to those who are delinquent in repaying 
loans. In addition, the program targeted neither large loans in agriculture, nor industrial 
loans that have even worse records of repayment. Financial indiscipline among the rich 
and influential has been growing simultaneous with the period of transition from Martial 
Law back to civilian rule. All doubts should now be removed, after President Ershad's 
interest forgiveness program soaked up many of the small loans, that the next target 
must be the larger loans of the wealthy (Hossain 1986, pg. 6). 
4.21 The RFP included a Rural Bank and Bank Users Survey (RBBUS) based on a 
sample of 6000 loans. It indicates that only 28% of loans are repaid within one year of 
being due. By the fourth year, this rate rises to 70%, and the remainder will not likely 
be repaid. Such low recovery rates force the BB to provide net new refinancing for about 
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50% of all agricultural credit demand in recent years. Basically, a viable financial system 
with tolerable interest rates is not possible until the recovery rate is raised to at least a 
level of 90% repayment over 3-4 years. 
4.22 The RFP identifies a number of major causes of the poor loan recovery record. 
As of FY87, about 30 percent of loans had not been recovered; perhaps as much as 10% 
due to bad weather, 3% to the death or departure of the loanee, 7% to false documents, 
and 10% to bad faith on the part of the borrower. The RFP emphasizes that while the 
overall socio/political climate sets a general tone for recoveries, the banks cannot and 
should not use this as an excuse for poor recovery levels. 
4.23 Data show that different branches and different banks, presumably having different 
management, have different recovery rates, but the same general setting. The larger the 
bank branch (and perhaps the more removed from client contact), the poorer the 
recovery rate. Also, contrary to conventional wisdom that recoveries increase when 
disbursements increase, this has not been the case in Bangladesh over the past five years 
at least. Insofar as this new credit went to those who had not repaid past debts, it seems 
to be feeding a habit of credit indiscipline. On the other hand, the fall in disbursements 
in both FY86 and FY87 did not lead to a fall in the recovery rate. During FY86, this 
can be explained in part by low prices of cash crops including rice and jute, but during 
FY87, the more plausible explanation seems to be simply a refusal to repay if new loans 
were not available (World Bank 1987, pg. 10). 
4.24 One of the stated intentions of President Ershad's interest remission program was 
to vigorously pursue defaulters of large loans, and those who did not respond to the 
amnesty, with firm legal sanctions. So far, there are few indications that Certificate cases 
have increased. Unless this procedure and other sanctions are followed, people will get 
the impression that it doesn't pay to repay, even when interest is forgiven. 
4.25 We recommend that strong sanctions be pursued against those defaulters who are 
clearly identifiable now that many others have taken advantage of the amnesty. No doubt 
these recalcitrants represent a deeply entrenched vested interest group. It will require 
more than ordinary political will and administrative commitment to affect this group. 
Simultaneously, we recommend that the more time-consuming process of persuasion 
through training and education must be started now through political and 
non-bureaucratic structures (Ahmed 1987, pg. 24). Also, the banks should accelerate their 
in-house training programs on loan recovery, especially how to reschedule loans to meet 
borrowers' ability to pay (Nathan Vol.1, 1986, pg. 91). Other recommendations that affect 
loan recovery are mentioned under subsequent sections. 
Loan Security and the Credit Passbook System 
4.26 Loans are backed by some form of collateral, either land or hypothecation typically 
of crops or equipment. Hypothecation requires that the banks adequately supervise the 
loan so that the same cow, for example, is not claimed as collateral by more than one 
person at a time. Also, the number of bank staff is too inadequate to be present at the 
time crops are harvested or fish sold to insure that the banks receive what is owed to 
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them. Using land as security poses a few problems, least among them being those of 
legal procedure as mentioned above. Indeed, there are examples of evasion of court 
action. Outweighing this is the problem of proof of land ownership due to out-dated and 
incomplete land records. The Credit Passbook has been introduced by some banks to 
a limited extent as a means of providing a record of credit worthiness. 
4.27 There are a number of problems, however. First, the number of borrowers far 
exceeds the number of passbooks printed. About 1.3 million passbooks have been issued 
as of June 1987, compared to 5.8 million agricultural loan accounts. Second, the 
passbooks have not been numbered and thus do not provide a security check against 
their forgery or theft. Much of the 279 million Taka under the 1982 Weavers Credit was 
misappropriated via forgeries of passbooks issued by the Handloom Board. 
4.28 Third, passbooks do not contain an extract from the land records which would 
allow for precise identification of rights. There is no way of knowing if several persons 
in a village are claiming the same piece of land. Liens or other obligations of the 
passbook holder are not shown. Part of the problem is that Registrar's Offices sometimes 
refuse to issue non-encumbrance certificates because the land records are so out-dated 
that they cannot make such a determination in good conscience. The BB has been 
exploring a substitute procedure in which the Registrar issues a "letter of undertaking" 
of a search, and the branch bank officers actually visit the land in question (Nathan 
Vol.3, 1986, pp. 13-134). 
4.29 Fourth, the passbook system seems to be subject to influence by rural elites. For 
FY87, the BB issued instructions which state "Identification of loanees in the passbook 
by the concerned Union Parishad chairmen would continue to be optional and subject 
to the discretion of the branch managers." As long as "identification" of potential 
borrowers is thought by branch managers to be synonymous with endorsement of the 
credit by political officials, it is not possible to hold branch bank managers fully 
accountable for their portfolios (Lu 1986, pg. 25). 
4.30 We recommend that every effort be made to correct the weaknesses in the 
passbook system as long as it does not onerously raise transaction costs for farmers. The 
potential good that can come from the passbook system outweighs the potential harm 
that it might cause farmers who are already handicapped by the present system of credit 
allocation. The NCBs/BKB should instruct their branches to make adoption of passbooks 
one of the criterion for promotion and bonuses of branch officers. All loans, including 
those of the NCBs, BKB, BSBL, and BRDB should be conditional upon the existence 
of a passbook. Also, all banks and cooperatives, within a reasonably large area, should 
be encouraged to exchange lists of borrowers to whom passbooks have been issued 
(World Bank, 1987, pg.15). Finally, we recommend that rural branch bank managers be 
insulated to a greater extent from the pressures of Union Parishad chairmen to loan 
funds to specific activities or individuals. 
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Savin&& Mobilization 
4.31 The household saving rate in Bangladesh is about 10%, which is low compared 
with other countries (Nathan Vol.1, 1986, pg. 15). Over the past decade, there do not 
appear to be signs that this rate has changed. What has changed, however, is the amount 
that has been funneled into banking institutions. The annual growth in bank deposits has 
averaged a phenomenal 34 percent during the past decade, but in the past two years, 
there has been a modest decrease in this growth rate. Total rural deposits have increased 
21-fold from Tk. 1 billion in FY76 to Tk.21 billion in FY86 as illustrated in Annex Table 
E. The deposit/GDP ratio averaged 11.8% for the 1976-80 period, and increased to 
16.7% for the 1980-85 period (Nathan Vol. 1, 1986, pg. 16). During the past decade, 
rural deposits have doubled from 9% to 19% of total deposits, and the average size of 
a rural branch bank deposit increased from Tk. 931 to Tk. 2840. In urban branches, the 
average size of deposits remained about four times larger than those in rural branches 
(Ahmed 1987, Tables 5 & 7). In the BKB, 20 percent of the depositers held 84 percent 
of all deposits. 
4.32 Much of the growth in rural deposits can be attributed to the four-fold increase in 
bank branches, increased disbursements of rural credit, higher interest rates, improved 
access (roads and communication), and development of the banking habit (Ahmed, 1987, 
pg. 9 and Khalily 1987). In 1980, rural bank interest rates on savings deposits were 
increased to roughly 2 percentage points above urban rates. The recent drop in the rate 
of increase in rural deposits may be due largely to the tightening of bank credit to which 
people tend to respond by hanging on to their cash. 
4.33 In a banking system where savings deposits and repayment of loans fall far short 
of the cash needed to meet demands for loans, one solution is usually to increase the 
amount of savings deposits. The most effective policy that the GOB could follow to 
accomplish this would be to promote increased GDP. Beyond this, banks could mobilize 
savings in a number of ways, many of which were brought out in a RFP seminar devoted 
to this topic in April 1987: 
1 ). A strategy should be developed, using new marketing and banking techniques, of how 
to attract small accounts that are currently stagnant; 
2). The bank staff must be motivated through training, recognition, and bonuses; 
3). The entire community should be involved in the savings process such as is done in 
the United Way Campaigns in the U.S., or the Swanirvar programs in Bangladesh; 
4). The banks need to make it easy for a client to withdraw the savings; 
5). With more than 2800 deposit accounts per branch, computers could vastly speed up 
the task of keeping the accounts up to date; 
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6). Many rural people lack confidence in the branch banks. The banks should make sure 
that the accounts remain confidential and that heirs can gain access easily in case of 
death of the depositor (a problem of transactions costs); 
7). These suggestions, many of which have already been tried, will work only if the 
banking system and the individuals in it are motivated to implement it (Nathan Vol.3, 
1986, pg.146; Alim 1982, pg. 80; Nathan Vol. 1, 1986, pg.91). 
Despite having identified ways of increasing bank deposits, we must caution the GOB 
against expanding savings mobilization at this time for two reasons. First, depositors are 
penalized for saving with banks because the "real" rate of interest is negative, and given 
the financial status of the banks, it may be difficult to raise the rate on savings deposits. 
Second, despite the conventional wisdom that individual savings should be placed in 
banks so that the money will then be provided for use in investments that yield the 
highest financial return, intermediation is not working well right now in Bangladesh. 
Banks should concentrate on improving borrower selection and loan recovery. The 
banking system cannot do everything at once, so priorities must be set (Nathan Vol. 1, 
1986, pg. 17). 
4.34 We recommend that the banking system concentrate on improving borrower 
selection and loan recovery, and wait to increase savings mobilization until intermediation 
has improved. In the meantime, we recommend that new marketing and banking 
techniques for mobilizing deposits be tested, and that bank officers be trained to attract 
deposits. We also recommend that responsibility for managing the National Savings 
Schemes should be transferred from the National Savings Directorate to the Bangladesh 
Bank, whereupon the BB would coordinate all savings mobilization programs (Nathan 
Vol. 1, 1986, pg. 90). 
Interest Rates 
4.35 In 1983, a 4 percent service charge was added to the 12 percent interest rate 
charged on most agricultural loans as per the recommendations of the joint review by 
the GOB and the IBRD. Savings accounts without checking facilities now pay 10 per-
cent/year (higher in rural areas), and fixed deposits earn on average 15 percent/year 
(see CEM 3/10/87 page 34 for a table of all interest rates). The GOB in 1980 set the 
rates to be paid on rural savings deposits at roughly 2% higher than those for urban 
savings (Khalily 1987, pg. 1). Nevertheless, the real weighted interest rate paid on 
deposits was negative five of the years from 1976 through 1984. The administrative costs 
of processing loans range between 3-6 percent, depending on the volume of lending and 
the size of loans. These figures are based on reports of the NCBs and the BKB and 
may reflect an underestimate because their branch banks do not undertake the full range 
of activities that would be required to attract more customers and to better monitor out-
standing loans. The cost of bad debts is equally difficult to measure. The range is 
estimated to be between 4-6% (Nathan Vol. 1, 1986, pg. 39). This current spread 
between the interest rates on savings and loan funds of about 6% does not cover the 
cost of operation which requires a spread of about 14 (including a slight profit margin). 
Thus the current interest rate on agricultural loans should be raised to above 24%. 
19 
4.36 Fortunately for the banks, the BB provides funds at a discounted rate of 8.5%. 
Even so, almost all banks are continuously operating at a loss (see subsequent section 
"Viability of Agricultural Credit"). Studies have shown that farmers are not overly 
sensitive to the rate of interest charged, provided credit is available on time, in adequate 
amounts, and without cumbersome procedures. The interest on their· alternative source 
of credit through money lenders is about 10%/month. The USAID Rural Finance 
Experimental Project (RFEP) demonstrated that interest rates up to 36% per annum 
could be charged without adversely affecting the demand for credit or repayment rates. 
But recovery rates decline when real interest rates increase within the range of -10% to 
+ 10%. No matter what the interest rate is that a bank offers, the real cost to the 
borrower is estimated to be an additional 10-15% of the amount because of the time and 
expense involved in obtaining a loan. From the saver's perspective, given the current 
interest rates, it is more beneficial to borrow funds than to save. In effect, a false 
demand for credit exists in the current banking system due to low interest rates (Nathan 
Vol. 3, 1986, pg.40; World Banlc 1987, pg.150; Cookson 1986, pg.7; World Bank 1983, 
pg.ii v.1). 
4.37 We repeat the recommendation in the Financial Sector Review that interest rates 
for agricultural loans be flexible to allow for changes in market conditions and inflation, 
among other things. To the extent that these rates continue to be held at levels below 
that which will cover the costs plus profit margin of an efficiently run bank, then the 
GOB should reimbur5e the banks for their loss. Also, to strengthen the incentive of 
borrowers to repay on schedule, the system of penalty interest charges on overdue loans 
should be revised. As an experiment, the GOB might try to incorporate the current 6% 
penalty into a revised "all inclusive" interest rate for new loans, perhaps as a fee, and 
returned in the form of a rebate to those borrowers who repay on time. Although this 
system would have to be monitored closely for abuses, it could tum penalties into 
incentives (World Bank 1987, pg.20). The problem with the above suggestions is that the 
GOB is not likely to raise interest rates on agricultural loans- not now, and not in the 
near future. Many officials believe that if interest rates (and recovery rates) are to be 
increased, it should be in non-agricultural sectors. We agree with the logic behind the 
advise given above, but it could only be implemented through subterfuge. We recommend 
that the BB explore ways of creatively marketing loans so that increases in interest rates 
do not appear so high. For example, interest rates could be quoted as a quarterly or 
monthly rate, rather than as an annual rate. Fees could also be tacked on outside of the 
formal interest rate. 
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V. Viability of A&ricultural Credit 
Context and Cost of Funds 
5.01 The viability of rural credit is only as strong as the overarching financial institutions 
in Bangladesh. While the recovery performance in the agricultural sector is dismal, it is 
better than in the industrial sector. The DFis are unable to be self-financing, and thus 
rely on donor support, while complaining often about donor "interference." The GOB was 
correct in identifying the expansion of agricultural credit as a means of meeting its goal 
of increased foodgrain production. But rather than establishing an effective policy for 
expanding agricultural credit for productive uses, the GOB resorted to relaxation of the 
normal banking practices of full-cost pricing. However, hindsight tells us that perhaps it 
was not realistic to expect a 4-fold increase in agricultural credit in 10 years, while at the 
same time having financially viable banking institutes. USAID's Rural Finance Project 
estimates that the most appropriate interest rate to allow the banking system to be 
financially self-sufficient is between 24-30%. Of course, the rate of interest on a loan 
makes absolutely no difference if the loan is not repaid. 
Crop Insurance 
5.02 Recent estimates indicate that perhaps up to 10 percent of all crop loans run into 
difficulty because of crop failure. As mentioned in the "History" section of this paper, the 
Indian and Pakistani administrations used to provide a distress loan known as Taccavi. 
This loan was administered through a relief department, but the loans were collected by 
a separate revenue department, which resulted in very low recovery ·rates. Currently the 
Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation provides material assistance in cases of natural 
disasters, but the loan function has moved over to the now expanded rural branch 
banking system. When a flood or drought destroys crops, for example, the government 
occasionally announces that interest payments on the loans will be forgiven. These 
announcements seem to be based more on the politics of the day than on a careful 
assessment of the damage and the consequences to the banks of cancelling the interest 
payments. The GOB has not yet implemented a recommendation of the Banking 
Commission that the GOB reimburse the banks for the loss. 
5.03 At present, the banking system does not have a system to satisfactorly manage 
loans affected by natural disasters. This results in the banks appearing unreasonable, thus 
giving their clients the excuse to default completely. By arranging to be fair to disaster 
victims, the banking system could enhance its credibility. To achieve this, the banks must 
improve client-bank relationships, and selectively reschedule loans based on an 
individualistic approach to each client. Currently, however, across-the-board 
announcements of interest forgiveness by the GOB, and the banks' inability to manage 
loans on a case by case basis, result in accounting nightmares at the rural bank level. 
5.04 We recommend that the proposed Rural Credit Guarantee Fund (RCGF) should 
have the following approach: First, it should define procedures for the GOB to follow 
in declaring the extent of any forgiveness program based on natural disaster, and should 
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reimburse the affected banks for most of their resulting losses. Second, RCGF financing 
should be shared by the GOB, the banks, and, since it is a form of crop credit insurance, 
by the borrowers. Borrower contributions should be mandatory and incorporated into 
crop loans as a fee. This premium would be small, perhaps only 1 percent, because the 
GOB and the banks would share the risk. Third, local agricultural officers, BB agents, 
and local bank officers, should be responsible for identifying which specific borrowers, 
villages, or unions (ie. the most specific level possible) should benefit from full or partial 
(such as postponement of debt repayment) amnesties based on field inspections. A vaste 
literature exists on crop insurance, and before proceeding the GOB should avail itself of 
it. 
Supervised. Tied. Targeted and Group Lendin~ 
5.05 Targeted Lending Programs are a favorite method of assistance by local NGO's. 
Despite their best intentions to help those who are most in need via targeted credit, 
their efforts occasionally fail, and usually undermine the financial system. Targeted 
lending usually fails to reach the intended client because where there is a subsidized 
program, the wealthy and the powerful will not be far away, seeking access to it (Adams 
1987). Second, credit is not an input; rather, it should be viewed as a claim on resources 
that are highly fungible (Adams 1983, pg. 244). Thus, a loan cannot be targeted with any 
degree of success without prohibitively high administrative costs. Third, targeting seriously 
undermines the fundamental ability of branch banks to intermediate by essentially telling 
the banker to whom to give a loan. 
Fourth, too many programs create an administrative nightmare for bankers in terms of 
different forms to fill out and reports to be filed. Fifth, if a branch banker must deal 
with a myriad of programs, he/she is unable to keep up with frequent changes made 
to them. Sixth, when a banker is unable to develop an expertise in a specific sector, 
shallow tube-wells loans, for example, the branch bank has a higher risk of making a 
loan that will not be repaid. Seventh, since not all branches handle all programs, 
borrowers sometimes must go from one bank to another to fulfill their various credit 
needs. "Full service" money lenders become an attractive alternative to this seeming lack 
of responsiveness from the banks. Eighth, because of the plethora of programs, it is 
difficult to verify an applicant's credit history (especially other current loans for other 
purposes), and it is difficult to evaluate whether the loan has been successfully used as 
intended, or whether the loan was repaid merely out of funds borrowed from another 
program (Alim 1982, pg. 37; Lu 1986, pg. 15). 
Tied loans are those that go directly to a supplier, perhaps through a letter of credit, 
rather than to the borrower first. For example, a loan for a shallow tube-well (STW) can 
be paid directly to the distributor of that STW intead of to the borrower. Tying loans 
in this manner may diminish the diversion of loans from production to consumption. 
More importantly, this approach should be seen as a way of lowering administrative 
costs. A bank could provide credit to a fertilizer dealer, for example, who in tum could 
pass on the credit to fertilizer purchasers. About 2 million farmers could be reached with 
credit, although only 8000 fertilizer retailers would meet directly with the banks (Islam 
1987). 
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5.08 Supervised credit is the approach that most non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
employ, and involves helping the recipients use correctly the inputs that they purchase 
with the loans. The formal banking sector has shied away from this approach due to its 
high administrative costs including that of maintaining a staff trained in extension work. 
The NGOs, in many cases, have kept these administrative costs to a minimum by relying 
on young, motivated semi-volunteers to do much of the work. The Grameen Banlc, for 
example, makes a point of using recent university graduates to do their field work. The 
NGOs have shown, however, that the rural poor are willing and able to pay back loans, 
including the cost of supervision, if that supervision shows them how to use the new 
inputs wisely. 
5.09 Group lendina is an approach that allows individuals without sufficient collateral 
to obtain a loan, and have a group guarantee that the loan will be repaid. Both the 
Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) have shown 
that this approach can work even among the landless and yield repayment rates over 
95%. Even so, commercial banks remain reluctant to take on supervised or group 
lending. Perhaps NGOs or public agencies such as BRDB could be more active in 
forming and preparing groups so that they will be more 'bankable'. The banks and the 
GOB should guard against having these entities become a barrier between small farmers 
and the landless poor. This can be accomplished by making sure that their staffs are well 
trained and motivated (World Bank 1987, pg. 150). 
5.10 Even though the Ohio State University and others mentioned above have put forth 
recommendations that seek a decrease in targeted lending, the table below shows that 
the trend in the number of targeted programs in Bangladesh has increased tremendously. 
Table 2. Number of Targeted Lending Programs in Bangladesh 
fY74 fY78 fY84 
Short term 3 5 23 
Medium term 6 6 22 
Long term il ~ 11 
TOTAL 9 15 56 
Source:R. Nathan, Final Report. Rural Finance 
PrQject. Vol. I, Sept. 1986, pg. 76. 
(It 
23 
5.11 Targeted credit schemes are offered by NGOs (of which there are more than 
400), cooperatives, bi-lateral donors, and the Bangladesh Bank. The BB alone has over 
60 specialized credit programs in the rural sector. These programs are crop-specific (eg. 
tea, jute), activity-specific (eg. irrigation projects), or client specific (eg. women) (Nathan 
Vol.3, 1986, pg.1). The following table lists some of those programs coordinated by the 
BB: 
Table 3. Bangladesh Bank Agricultural Credit by Program, FY86 
Program FY86 
(in million taka) 
Fishing Ponds 
Cold Storage 
Swiss Post-Harvest Project 
ASARRD (FAO/UNDP) Project 
Rural Finance Project (USAID) 
Swanirvar Program 
IFAD Small Farmer 
RD-II (IBRD, CIDA, UNDP) 
N.W. Rural Devel. (ADB, IFAD) 
IDA Credit #1147-D 
Rural Housing 
Banana Plantations 
Rural Transportation 
Shrimp Culture 
Lac/Shellac Culture 
Rower Pump 
Commercial Poultry 
TOTAL 
35.3 
283.1 
7.2 
3.5 
450.0 
80.0 
30.0 
650.0 
3.0 
75.0 
80.0 
1.1 
1.9 
52.0 
0.2 
0.3 
Q.1 
1753.3 
(Approx. $57 million) 
Source: Figures are mostly estimates based on data from the 
Bangladesh Bank Annual Report 1985-86. 
5.12 The GOB should reduce the number of specialized loan programs. A first step 
would be to ask donors to refrain from establishing special (targeted) accounts for 
on-lending; rather, they should put their funds into existing channels of the BB, NCBs, 
Grameen Bank, cooperatives, etc. 
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Productivity and Intermediation 
5.13 Experience worldwide indicates that if Bangladesh can increase its GDP, then its 
rate of savings will increase, and the banking systeni can draw on these savings to 
finance loans which will further promote growth in productivity. This relationship is more 
profound than just noting that wealth is positively related to development. If farmers 
cannot use agricultural credit productively, then they will either not agree to take loans 
at high interest rates that cover the cost of the loans, or they will default on the loans. 
Thus, the profitability of credit must be considered from the point of view of the 
borrower as well as that of the lender. An ideal interest rate structure is one that 
maximizes the profits of both the totality of banking institutions, as well as those of 
farmers. 
5.14 In other words, the interest rates and repayment schedules should not be so 
onerous that only a few people find them profitable (or evadable). Likewise, the 
repayment schedules should not be unrealistic. It should be in the banks' interest to 
make sure that interest rates are affordable and that productive opportunities are 
promoted. Banks need to both seek out and promote situations in the agricultural sector 
where: a). Appropriate new technologies are available through the research and 
extension systems; b ). The educational system gives people the skills necessary to 
understand and use the new technology; c ). The physical infrastructure, such as 
transportation and communication networks, minimize marketing costs; d). Prices are 
attractive. In short, as Richard Meyer has said, "it is difficult to promote a viable 
banking system if the borrowers it serves are not healthy." 
5.15 In order to be of service to society as a whole, the banking system must be able 
to handle intermediation. Intermediation is the process by which banks mobilize 
resources, apply them to the most productive opportunities, and recover these resources 
for future use during the next cycle (Nathan Vol.1, 1986, pg.86). For example, borrowers 
who are delinquent in their loan payments enjoy the opportunity of recirculating loan 
funds in their businesses and households. Although the original use of the loan may have 
earned a high rate of return, subsequent uses by the borrower may not. Potential 
borrowers, many of whom may have higher rate of return projects, are denied loans 
because the lenders cannot re-lend unrecovered funds (Meyer, 1986, pg.5). This socially 
beneficial role of banking breaks down if the banks are unable to identify uses of funds 
that yield a higher return than they would in the hands of those who originally held 
them, ie. the BB or private individuals and companies. In Bangladesh right now, the first 
priority of the banking system seems to be on improving borrower selection and loan 
recovery (Cookson 1987, pg.17). 
Attitudes 
5.16 The health of the banking system in Bangladesh is currently more a matter of 
attitude toward this system than the system itself. The best designed system cannot work 
if those who implement it are not concerned about the future of the system in particular, 
and the nation in general (Huda, 1986, pg.5). As mentioned earlier, many people view 
credit as a dole, particularly if it comes from the government, and even more so if 
.. 
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donors are behind it. The poor recovery rates over the past five years exemplify current 
attitudes (Malony 1986, pg.152). 
5.17 Many top policy-makers have been emphasizing short-term political gains at the 
expense of medium and long term considerations. There is evidence, both in public 
announcements and in private actions, that they are using the banking system to serve 
the social objectives of redistributing resources to lower income groups and to 
themselves. This happened clearly in 1982 in the Rajshahi Division when a military 
official started a program called "Matir Dak, ("Of the Soil)," in which loans were dis-
bursed, perhaps with the best of social intentions, but with little thought given to ability 
or willingness to repay them. In 1983, Union Agricultural Credit Committees (UACCs) 
were created as part of the SACP to help the banks locate potential borrowers. In fact, 
banks could not make loans to people who did not first appear on the UACC lists. The 
members of these committees, however, were not required to guarantee these loans, the 
great majority of which were never repaid. Often they, their families, and their 
supporters were the greatest abusers. Data on crop loans alone from the BKB through 
the end of FY86 indicate the nature of the problem: 
1 ). Current and former Union Parishad Chairmen and Members had 16,005 overdue 
loans, the average amount being equivalent to $478 (three times the annual per capita 
income in Bangladesh); 
2). Current Upazila Chairmen have 150 overdue loans averaging $3677 each (24 times 
Bangladesh's per capita income) (Ali 1986, pg.22). This example set by the rural elite is 
not conducive to the collection of loans from others. 
5.18 The GOB continues to state officially a commitment to loan recovery. The BB has 
attempted to implement this policy on a number of occasions by issuing directives. Such 
directives were superseded on at least two occasions, one in February 1985, and again 
in February 1986 in directives issued by the President's Office. These directives restricted 
pursuit of loan recovery certificate cases (Lu 1986, pg. 7; Nathan Vol. 1, 1986, pg. 62). 
On April 25, 1987, the President directed the Finance Ministry to examine the possibility 
of a reduced rate of interest on credit to weavers. The June 5th deadline for repayments 
of small crop loans with interest exemption resulted in a large increase in repayments 
(see the "Recoveries" section). But there are no indications that the GOB is following 
through with its statements to pursue defaulters through the legal system. In June, the 
Finance Minister announced in his Annual Budget speech that they are exploring 
"rebates to those borrowers who will repay their loans on schedule." This is a sorry state 
when rewards must be considered for completion of legally binding loan agreements. 
More recently during the August 1987 floods, the President ordered the banks to extend 
agricultural credit to the affected and poor farmers. Fortunately this time, as opposed to 
times in the recent past, the President did not offer loan foregiveness; rather, he ordered 
loan rescheduling. 
5.19 Attitudes within the banking system are starting to improve. Still, the tendency is 
for the banks to blame every ill on the politicians, rather than undertake a number of 
actions that could greatly improve the banking system. For example, while importance 
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is attached to repayments, the timeliness of those repayments does not seem to be of 
concern. Branch banks keep records of credit outstanding, but they do not have records 
about what is due or overdue. Bankers must be instilled with the notion that loan 
collection is an integral part of banking, and it should be done on a regular basis in a 
systematic fashion. (Lu 1986, pg.5; Cookson 1987). 
Corruption 
5.20 In a society where potential borrowers are mostly poor, illiterate, and unfamiliar 
with banking procedures, corruption in the form of "baksheesh" is quite common as a 
way of getting the papers through the system. Fraudulent loans, such as loans to 
non-existent people, can be reduced if a branch banker was occasionally thrown into jail 
as a deterrent by example. Kick-backs to bank staff will be hard to control as long as 
institutional loans are so much less expensive than the alternative non-institutional loans. 
Both forms of corruption can be diminished through more policing of the system. The 
net effect in the short-run would most likely be a decrease in disbursements. 
Nevertheless, banks must seek ways to combat pervasive corruption so that its effect of 
raising transaction costs does not drive away clients and integrity can be restored to the 
system. Top bank managers should provide better training and supervision, reward 
honesty, and give enthusiastic support to observance of legitimate banking practices 
(Nathan Vol. 1, 1986, pg.11). 
Lepl System 
5.21 There are two mechanisms for the collection of overdue loans; the civil court 
system and seizure of assets under the Public Demand Recovery Act. Both systems have 
been examined in depth by USAID's Rural Finance Project and found to be acceptable. 
What is not adequate is the implementation of these existing regulations and the 
establishment of more precise procedures with regard to the identification and policing 
of overdue loans (Nathan Vol. 3, 1986, pg.113). These systems are misused to collect 
occasionally a large number of very small loans and a small number of large loans. Also, 
there is a reluctance to use these collection systems of last resort against those who are 
politically powerful. More than ordinary political will and administrative commitment are 
required to change this situation which intimidates bank officials who even contemplate 
using pressure to collect overdue loans. 
5.22 The civil courts are comparatively immune to political pressure, but such litigation 
is exceedingly slow and costly. Until the present huge number of defaulters is reduced 
through the Certificates Procedure, the courts will not be able to assume their proper 
role of resolving these cases, while fully protecting the rights of the accused. Also, 
lawyers representing the banks are selected by the Ministry of Law and Justice. The 
banks should be given the right to select their own counsel (Lu 1986, pg.8). 
5.23 The Public Demands Recovery Act of 1913, and amended as recently as July 1987, 
is the basic legal procedure for the recovery of overdue bank loans. This non-court 
procedure was originally developed for the collection of overdue land taxes/revenues by 
the British colonial authorities. This procedure permits the value of overdues to be 
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collected by the sale of seized assets by a Certificate Officer. District Magistrates have 
this title and the power to redelegate the authority to others. But they have been slow 
in vesting this power in the Upazila Magistrates where it should be. Understaffed, the 
District Magistrates should be authorized to appoint temporary servers and clerks to 
handle the certificate case-load. Also, officers of the Grameen Bank, the BKB, and 
some others have been permitted to become their own Certificate Officers, but as of 
FY86, no bank has actually done this. This option is being avoided because a coercive 
collection function would hurt the image of bankers. 
5.24 Certificate proceedings, particularly a special, expedited procedure that eliminates 
the accused's right of appeal and hearing, are not ideal. But given the huge number of 
overdues, these implementation procedures should be pursued. During FY85, there were 
over 5 million rural borrowers, of which about 1.5 million had overdue loans, yet only 
260,000 Certificate Cases have ever been filed, and only 60,000 have ever been settled 
(Nathan Vol.1, 1986, pg.71). A constraint that should be reviewed is the cost to the 
banks of pursuing Certificate Cases. They must pay 16 2/3% of the outstanding loan 
amount as a non-reimbursable fee even if the case is lost. 
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VI. Formal Institutions 
The B3Jli}adesh Bank 
6.01 The Bangladesh Bank is the Central Bank, and among other functions, coordinates 
and guides all agricultural credit. The BKB handled 58% of the total volume of 
agricultural credit in FY86, the NCBs 40%, and the cooperatives under BSBL 2%. From 
these banks, 9% of all credit was channeled through the Bangladesh Rural Development 
Board (BRDB) cooperative system. 
RefinancinK and Loan Guarantees 
6.02 One of the major functions of the BB is to refinance the banks' loans, and handle 
loan guarantees from the GOB. Both of these topics are discussed at length in the 1983 
Joint Agricultural Credit Review, and thus will only be summarized briefly here. During 
FY85, an amount equivalent to 69 percent of all formal sector agricultural credit was 
refinanced by the BB. This is quite high and indicates the importance of such funds for 
the banks. 
6.03 The simultaneous goals of controlling the monetary supply, promoting growth in 
the rural sector, and providing the correct incentives to savings mobilization are not 
always complementary. For example, the BB could in theory be used to force rural 
branch banks to improve their loan recovery rate by restricting refinance to those banks 
that are out of line. In practice, however, a credit ceiling on branch banks already exists 
as part of an IMF-sponsored monetary policy. Thus, loan recoveries would only increase 
if the interest rate on refinancing from the BB were raised to a point where branch 
banks would find it cheaper to recover loans than to borrow from the BB. This is not 
feasible in the short run because it would lead to an overall higher cost of capital, and 
thus a net slow-down in the velocity of money. As a second best solution, the BB should 
continue its policy during recent years of raising the refinancing rate to promote savings 
mobilization, while avoiding a de-capitalization of the economy (World Bank 1983, pg. 
iv; Nathan Vol. 1, 1986, pg. 15). 
AccountinK Procedures 
6.04 The BB has been adjusting its regulations with respect to loan classification, the 
eligibility of accrued interest as current income to the bank, and the provision of bad 
debt allowances at the Head Office. However, there is room for further improvement. 
Using the current accrual system of accounting, an outstanding loan and the interest 
payments are reported as income, and very little consideration is given to bad debts. 
Thus the more loans a branch employee makes, regardless of whether it is a good or 
bad loan, improves the "performance" of the bank. The common practice of rolling over 
bad debts on the books simply conceals a poor recovery rate, and allows the employees 
to collect year-end bonuses for delivering high income levels (Nathan Vol. 3, 1986, pg. 
44). The final report of the USAID Rural Finance Project (RFP) makes the following 
recommendatons: 
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1. Clear guidelines on when loans should be written off need to be established, and 
a loan loss rate determined. This rate should be applied to new advances and these 
funds should be set aside in a reserve fund to protect the depositors' interests. 
2. Loans that are clearly in default at the present time, such as loans from Pakistani 
times, should be written off. 
3. Clear guidelines need to be established on how to report income and expenses. H 
income continues to be reported on an accrual basis, then expenses should also be 
accrued. Income on overdue loans should not be reported as "realized." A separate line 
item for "deferred" income might be appropriate, depending on whatever new accounting 
procedures were introduced (Nathan Vol. 3, 1986, pg. 44). Another negative side of the 
current procedure, which presents the illusion that 80% of the banks are making profits 
(in fact, the opposite seems to be true), is that the GOB taxes these "profits." Once the 
BB changes the accounting procedures, then the GOB should allow bad debts to be tax 
deductible. Of course, the GOB will then have to adjust to lower revenues originating 
from banks. Also, the financial statements in the banking system should be prepared as 
required by the International Accounting Standards Committee (Nathan Vol. 1, 1986, 
pg. 55). 
"Mana1:ement by Directive" 
6.05 "Management by directive" describes the BB's style of operation, and why BB is 
unable to resolve many long-standing problems. Directives are almost meaningless if 
they reflect little understanding of reality, or if they are overruled or superseded by the 
President's Cabinet. This has happened quite often in the past. The BB should renew its 
efforts to gather political support for its new directives, and test them in the field prior 
to their formal issuance. In addition, the donors must be somewhat understanding of this 
problem, especially as some of the directives are at their urging, and a condition to the 
release of funds. Perhaps the BB and donors should more equally share the responsibility 
of convincing higher authorities that recommended changes in significant policy are 
worthy of support. 
Appointment of Directors 
6.06 Frequent rotation of senior branch bank managers has some advantages such as 
minimizing corruption as well as boredom. But it also has negative consequences. For 
example, it limits the development of close relationships with clients that is so necessary 
in a bank. Long range planning is inhibited, and rap~d turnover means that only the rare 
manager develops a sense of pride in building up ·a branch that he is soon to leave. 
The Rural Finance Project ascertained that between 1980-85, Managing Directors were 
rotated on average every 1.3 years, and General Managers every 1.8 years. 
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Jurisdiction of BCD /ACD /RCPD /ICD 
' 
6.07 Conflicting circulars concerning rural credit are occasionally issued by the BB from 
different departments. The Agricultural Credit Department (ACD) and the Rural Credit 
Project Department (RCPD) both issue circulars about lending policy. Both the Banking 
Control Department (BCD) and the ACD issue circulars concerning refinance. Finally, 
the Industrial Credit Department (ICD) coordinates industrial loans in rural areas. The 
Joint Agricultural Credit Review in 1983 offered some recommendations that bear 
high-lighting. The ACD should continue to deal with the national credit programs 
including cooperatives. The RCPD should continue to manage the IF AD and IDA credit 
projects as well as develop some new projects, and thought be given to folding them 
into one department after the termination of IBRD Project (World Banlc, 1987, pg. 74). 
In the meantime, these departments should be better coordinated under a common 
Executive Director (Nathan Vol. 3, 1986, pg. 6-14;). 
The BKB and the NCBs 
6.08 The BKB and the NCBs accounted for over 98 percent of formal sector 
agricultural disbursement during FY86, while the BSBL provided the remainder as shown 
in Annex Table A. However, the BSBL is not the only cooperative system in Bangladesh. 
The BKB and the NCBs channel about 10 percent of all disbursements through the 
Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB). The breakdown of disbursements is 
detailed in Table B in the annex and in the table below: 
6.09 These figures indicate the relative importance of each bank, and the fact that they 
all face debt repayment problems. Up to February 1987, 30 additional branches were 
opened, disbursements increased slightly to 6361 million Taka in FY87, and that the 
BKB's share of all agricultural loans increased from about 58 percent last year to about 
68 percent in FY87. 
6.10 The BKB remains the lead institution in rural finance in Bangladesh. The policies 
and programs of the NCBs are now quite similar. In March 1987, the BKB opened up 
the Rajshahi Krishi Bank, the first of what will be four regional banks that will all but 
close the BKB. It seems that an overall improvement in the performance of BKB could 
have been effected by delegating greater responsibility to its zonal offices without what 
seems to be a duplication of bureaucracy. We recommend that a decision on 
reorganization be deferred until other changes recommended herein concerning the 
NCBs and the BKB are implemented and the results observed. 
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Table 4. Rural Operations of the BKB and the NCBs 
:/I of Disburse- Outstanding % of Recovery 
Branches• men ts Dues FY86 ••• 
(in million Taka) 
NCBs: 
Sonali 905 1908 5867 22 percent 
Janata 544 253 1956 25 
Agrani 544 243 1484 25 
Rupali 274 87 796 14 
Private: 
Pubali 126** 36 715 14 
Uttara 125** IlJl,_ _ill_ 24 
Sub-total 2518 2527 10964 22 
BKB 929 365 11470 31 
BSBL n.a. _liQ_ 
.1ll8... .1S. 
Tu1al 3453 6317 23752 26 
• Figures as of August 31, 1986. 
• • Total divided equally between these two due to lack of data. 
• • • Recovered as percent of total due for recovery. 
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The BSBL and the BRDB Cooperatives 
6.11 The BSBL handles only about 2 percent of formal agricultural credit as the table 
above indicates. The GOB recognizes that this three-tiered cooperative system, with 
liabilities exceeding assets by Tk. 500 million, needs reform. The Bangladesh Rural 
Development Board (BRDB) oversees 448 Upazila Central Cooperative Associations 
(UCCAs) and 86,857 primary societies. These include the KSS- Krishak (Farmers') 
Samabay (Cooperative) Samity (Association), the MSS- Mahila (Womens') Samabay 
Samity, and the BSS- Bittahin (Landless) Samabay Samity. Most of the funding comes 
from the Sonali Bank, which makes extensive use of the refinance window of the BB and 
GOB loan guarantees. Despite this extensive network, it only accounts for about 10 
percent of all formal agricultural credit, and its recovery rate is also poor. This so-called 
cooperative system is a far cry from the Comilla co<>peratives that truly represented the 
views of its members. Thus, only about 10 percent of the UCCAs are financially viable. 
The problems of both of these structures were discussed in detail in the IDA/GOB 
Agriculture Credit Review in 1983. At the 1986 donor community meeting in Bonn, the 
GOB agreed that a Joint Review of the Cooperative System in Bangladesh would be 
undertaken. The Terms of Reference are still being discussed. 
The Grameen Bank. BRAC and the Swanirvar Proiram 
6.12 Since much has been written about the Grameen Bank in particular, this report 
will only mention a few points. The Grameen Bank, BRAC, and the Swanirvar Program 
use peer pressure to get around the problem of lack of collateral and poor repayment 
records. The Grameen Bank's approach also includes the following: 
a). Promotion of strong groups through mandatory training and consciousness-raising; b ). 
Compulsory deposits; c). Extensive supervision of loans; d). Unhurried expansion; e). 
Participative decision-making; t). Decentralization of decision-making; g). Financial dis-
cipline; h). Interest rates of over 21 percent on loans; i). Focus on women, who 
constituted 76 percent of the membership in 1986. 
6.13 The Grameen Bank's very high recovery rate of 98 percent over the past few years 
has attracted international attention as a possible model. Some of the constraints to the 
replication of the Grameen model include: a). A staff that is young, idealistic, and 
motivated by a charismatic leader- an effective combination, but one that is difficult to 
replicate; b ). A portfolio consisting mainly of loans for trading, manufacturing, livestock, 
and fisheries, with very little for crop production; c). Geographically localized success 
(operations in 20% of the Unions, total of 254,000 members); d). Funding that is largely 
dependent upon grants from IF AD and the BB for its Dhaka operations. Even though 
these issues raise some doubts about the potential for using the Grameen Bank as a 
model, the NCB/BKB branches should study these approaches, and possibly test them 
in their own branches (Lu 1986, pp. 39-54; Nathan Vol. 3, 1986, pp. 6, 9, 12;). 
6.14 The Swanirvar (self-reliance) Programme is one of a number of specialized 
programs that are run by the NCBs and BKB. These other programs will be discussed 
briefly under the rubric of "Donors and Targeted Credit." Started in 1978 as the "Paddy 
33 
Husking Loan Scheme," this group lending program targets those who have less than 0.4 
acres of cultivable land, or incomes less than Tk. 6,000 per year. Swanirvar now operates 
in 17 percent of the 448 Upazilas, extending loans of less than Tk. 5,000 each to 400,000 
families. The loans are used for such activities as rice trading, small ruminants, the 
manufacture of puffed rice, and rickshaw manufacture and leasing. To keep this program 
going, about 3500 volunteers work on a commission basis only. 
6.15 While the program has had no small impact on lower income groups, there are 
a few limitations: First, not all needs can be met with such a small limit on loan size. 
Second, as is the case with the Grameen Bank, it will be hard to maintain or expand the 
program without offering more incentives to the volunteers. Third, each group should be 
required to maintain at least 10 percent of the total amount borrowed as security against 
the loan. Fourth, cooperatives should follow the same reporting procedures as other 
credit institutions so that inefficiencies can be avoided. As of June 30th, 1987, 20 
percent of the Tk. 555 million disbursed was overdue. Of the total amount disbursed, 
BKB handled 28%, the private banks 4%, and the the NCBs the balance (B.B. 1985-86, 
pp.745; Nathan Vol. 3, 1986, pp. 97, 140). 
Access, Eqyity, and Women 
6.16 The SACP attempted to redress one of the major concerns of institutional credit-
making it accessible to the rural poor. As discussed above, the 3-fold increase in the 
number of rural bank branches has facilitated access. To get around a farmer's inability 
to offer adequate collateral, the SACP allowed bankers to disburse a loan on 
hypothecation- that is against standing crops, livestock, fish, handicrafts, machinery, and 
equipment. While well-intended, this added to the high default rate that the banks 
presently face. Low interest rates were another way of trying to help the poor. However, 
the main beneficiaries were not the poor, because the subsidy implicit in the low interest 
rates became concentrated in large loans to relatively wealthy farmers (Cookson 1986, 
pg. 1). Also, the size of individual loans have been increasing since FY76, as have the 
size of land holdings of the recipients of loans. 
6.17 Cooperatives and targeted programs are often thought of as part of the solution 
to the problem of access and equity. One of the problems with cooperatives has been 
that over time, they tend to be taken over by the affluent. A satisfactory solution to this 
has not been found yet. Some of the targeted programs have been quite successful. The 
Grameen Bank targets women for three principle reasons. First, women are respected in 
this society as being more thrifty than men. The stereotype of this is the women who 
holds back some rice from that allotted to a meal so that it can be used when an 
emergency or an investment opportunity arises. Second, women have a better repayment 
record than men. Third, women have been neglected by the formal banking system 
because of such things as the banks' inability to accommodate satisfactorily a women in 
purdah. Thus there is much untapped potential for steering the savings of women away 
from the earthen jar and marginally profitable investments, and into the formal banking 
system. 
34 
General Administration of Rural Branch Banks 
6.18 H the system of loan delivery is faulty to begin with, then the probability of loan 
recovery will be quite low. The Rural Finance Project (RFP) observed many branch 
banks and noted a few characteristics that can be generalized: a). They are doing the 
best they can under adverse circumstances; b ). Training, both initial orientation and 
in-service, is infrequent in quantity and cursory in quality; c). An atmosphere of frustra-
tion, lack of incentives, and lack of motivation pervades the system and threatens not 
only the quality of the data that is reported, but also the quality of the loans (Ahmed 
1987, pg. 2). 
6.19 According to the RFP recommendations, the banks must be encouraged to "provide 
for a system of incentives and changes in rules and regulations that would affect the 
motivation of rural branch bank managers and staff, thereby to increase their efforts to 
mobilize savings, increase loan recovery rates, sanction productive, high return loans and 
operate efficient branch banks (Nathan Vol. 1, 1986, pg. 86). The amount and nature 
of paperwork that are required of branch banks remain a major constraints to rural 
banking. Inadequate provisions for bad debt and the accrual system of accounting have 
led to distortions in bank balance sheets and the incentives of employees. With non-per-
forming loans and uncollected interest charges counted as assets, the banks appear as 
though they are in better financial health than is really the case. RFP reports 
recommend that the banks need to increase the bad debt provisions and write off bad 
loans sooner than they are doing at present. A new reporting system should require that 
loans are classified by age, and that they be broken down according to principal, interest, 
and service charges. 
6.20 The RFP reports also indicate that of the 160 or so reports that each branch 
generates, none are computerized; therefore the central banks do not give feedback, and 
the data are not fed into a central data-bank system. The number of reports submitted 
is excessive, leaving little time for the staff to analyze that which has been reported or 
to reconcile the differences in numbers reported at different levels in the banks (Nathan 
Vol. 1, 1986, pp. 53, 84). 
6.21 To be more responsive to client needs, the RFP again offers numerous suggestions. 
For example: 
a). Other banks may want to follow the example of Agrani Bank and schedule office 
hours that ae convenient to the client, e.g. 3-7 p.m. for farmers; 
b ). Confidentiality of client data must be assured; 
c). NGOs could be enlisted to be the intermediaries between banks and potential new 
clients ( eg. they could supervise the use of credit so that the borrower actually obtains 
the potential benefits); 
d). BKB and NCBs should try some less conventional programs such as group lending 
and the Contract Savings and Credit Scheme; 
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e ). Special rooms or procedures should be instituted to provide access to those who are 
typically disenfranchised- illiterates and Purdanashin women (Nathan Vol.1, 1986, pg.21). 
6.21 The BB should give all banks greater autonomy in matters of selection, recruitment, 
training, compensation, and promotion of branch employees (Nathan Vol. 1, 1986, pg. 
20). The RFP reports include a number of suggestions in this regard. For example, the 
reports suggest the following: 
a). Employee incentives should be shifted from loan disbursements to loan recoveries, 
with manages held accountable for bad loans, and given bonuses for high levels of 
collections; 
b ). Salaries of NCB and BKB staff should be increased so they can attract and ratain 
competent staff; 
c ). Banks need to clarify their goals, and then set up incentives and punishments for 
each level of the organization- from the GM, to the regional banks, to the branch banks, 
to the loan officer; 
d). In order to properly check on potential and current borrowers, the ratio of field 
workers to borrowers shold not exceed 250, and a supply of bicycles or motorcycles 
might help relieve the problems of mobility; 
e ). Training courses that were designed by the RFP for the central and regional offices 
should be implemented; 
f). Branch manages should have authority to reschedule smaller loans which have not 
previously been rescheduled, but the recommendation should be subject to review at the 
division level. 
6.22 Concerning the overall management of agricultural credit, we emphasize the 
following recommendations: 
a). Department of Agricultural Extension personnel should be trained in and assigned 
to advise farmers on the importance of credit discipline; 
b ). Upazila and District authorities should be instructed to help impose sanctions on 
larger defaulters. Given tht these same authorities are often part of the problem, it will 
not be easy making this recommendation work. One way is continue emphasizing the 
importance of tying the release of Upazila Development Grants to progress in loan 
recovery; 
c). The GOB should implement fully their order to disallow defaulters from holding 
political office; 
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d). Certificate or other legal proceedings should begin automatically no earlier than 90 
days and no later than 150 days from the date of default; 
e ). Assign life-of-loan responsibilities to specific loan officers. 
6.23 The BB is aware of many of these, as well as other deficiencies. In 1986, the BB 
took the positive step of issuing five management directives to the NCBs and the BKB. 
They included: 
a). Incentives for loan recoveries; 
b ). Increased presence of senior staff at rural branches; 
c). Encouragement to pursue Certificate cases; 
d). Improved knowledge of the true loan recovery position; 
e). Circulation of defaulter lists among the banks (Nathan Vol. 1, 1986, pg. 80). As 
previously mentioned, "management by circular" is a style that is often ineffective if 
difficult changes are truly desired. 
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Annex Table A 
AGRICULTURAL LOANS ISSUED BY MAJOR CREDIT INSTITUTIONS, BANGLADESH FY1977 - FY1987 
( millions of taka J 
Source\FY 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CCHUCIAL BANKS: /a 560.1 845.1 777.1 1,013.0 1,170.3 1,172.6 2,547.9 3,908.9 5,068.1 2,526.7 2,083.2 
Short-term agr.(crop) loans /b 496.l 767.1 648.2 874.4 1,038.4 949.8 1,937.7 2,765.5 3,390.3 1,423.5 1,562.6 
Other agricultural financing/c 7.2 5.4 5.0 9.5 57.0 113.5 518.3 877.9 1,271.1 726.2 200.4 
Fisheries financing 0.1 11.1 37.7 27.0 11.2 10.8 25.3 106.8 78.9 181.9 52.1 
Tea prod.& developnent financing 29.2 35.4 63.3 66.5 27.6 36.3 21.9 35.8 66.7 62.8 60.3 
Cold storage for agri.products 27.5 26.1 22.9 35.6 36.1 62.2 44.7 122.9 261.1 132.3 207.8 
BANGLADESH KRISHI BANK: 388.4 542.3 741.7 1,420.0 2,097.4 2,710.4 4,008.1 5,924.3 6,147.3 3,650.6 4,419.1 
Short-term agr.(crop) loans /b 96.9 186.9 173.2 255.4 730.4 1,099.6 1,383.3 2,163.8 1,573.9 384.8 1,433.2 
Other agricultural financing/c 119.9 160.3 268.4 688.6 667.2 926.9 2,051.1 3,149.5 3,422.9 2,009.5 1,056.5 
Fisheries financing 0.6 13.7 39.5 47.5 73.7 69.5 56.4 128.8 165.1 103.4 52.2 
Tea prod.& developnent financing 161.8 179.0 247.5 411.7 579.6 563.0 458.6 323.6 841.3 1,008.4 926.8 
Cold storage for agri.products 9.2 2.4 13.1 16.8 46.5 51.4 58.7 158.6 144.1 144.5 180.9 
BANGLADESH IWWIAYA BANK: 111.8 158.2 201.1 255.8 257.0 174.1 229.5 219.8 283.0 139.9 170.5 
Short-term agr.(crop) loans /b 93.6 131.4 165.9 224.5 207.0 137.2 190.1 180.4 229.9 94.6 128.7 
Other agricultural financing/c 18.2 26.8 35.2 31.3 50.0 36.9 39.4 39.4 53.1 45.3 41.8 
ALL MAJOR CREDIT INSTITUTIONS: 1,060.3 1,545.6 1,719.9 2,688.8 3,524.7 4,057.1 6,785.5 10,053.0 11,498.4 6,317.2 6,672.8 
Short-term agr.(crop) loans /b 686.6 1,085.4 987.3 1,354.3 1,975.8 2,186.6 3,511.1 5,109.7 5,194.l 1,902.9 3,124.5 
Other agricultural financing/c 145.3 192.5 308.6 729.4 774.2 1,077.3 2,608.8 4,066.8 4,747.1 2,781.0 1,298.7 
Fisheries financing 0.7 24.8 77.2 74.5 84.9 80.3 81.7 235.6 244.0 285.3 104.3 
Tea prod.& developnent financing 191.0 214.4 310.8 478.2 607.2 599.3 480.5 359.4 908.0 1,071.2 987.1 
Cold storage for agri.products 36.7 28.5 36.0 52.4 82.6 113.6 103.4 281.5 405.2 276.8 388.7 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Out of totai disbursement: Credits 
Channelled through Coopv.under BRDB 108.0 122.0 205.0 256.0 258.0 4,065.0 3,227.0 1,202.0 596.0 480.9 
Paddy 102.0 112.0 191.0 237.0 245.0 3,932.0 2,895.0 1,202.0 571.0 465.7 
--T.Aman 33.0 34.0 51.0 71.0 73.0 554.0 965.0 1,202.0 185.0 100.0 
--Boro 48.0 45.0 85.0 115.0 132.0 1,689.0 965.0 * 331.0 311.8 
--Aus/B.Aman 21.0 33.0 55.0 51.0 40.0 1,689.0 965.0 * 55.0 53.9 Wheat 2.0 4.0 8.0 11.0 9.0 96.0 332.0 * 7.0 4.2 Potato 4.0 6.0 6.0 8.0 4.0 37.0 * * 18.0 11.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/a Including re-financing provided by the Sonali Bank to co-operatives under BRDB. 
/b Crops other than Tea. 
/c Including agricultural credit as well as financing for marketing, transport, and agroindustries. 
/d Includes Tk 542.8 mill. under Bangladesh Krishi Bank (BXB) and Tk 226.7 mill. under Rajshahi Krishi 
Unnayan Bank (RKUB) for which breakdown by type of credits is not available. 
/* Less than 1.0 million. 
Data source: World Bank Mission (for FY77-FY82, & FY87 data); Agr. Credit Dept. of Bangladesh Bank (for FY83-FY86 data). 
" 
/d 
39 
Annex Table B 
GROWTH OF BANK BRANCHES IN BANGI.ADESH, 1981-1988 
[ as at June 30th of each year ] 
Area\Yr 1981 
Urban 1,363 
Rural 2,839 
TOTAL 4,202 
1982 
1,538 
2,932 
4,470 
1983 
1,553 
3,050 
4,603 
/p Provisional data upto March 1988. 
/- Data not available. 
1984 
1,589 
3,228 
4,817 
Source: Bangladesh Bank, Banking Control Department. 
1985 
1,628 
3,335 
4,963 
1986 
1,668 
3,446 
5,114 
1987 1988/p 
5,223 5,293 
'• 
Fiscal 
Years 
1978 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987/p 
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Annex Table C 
TRENDS IN THE SUPPLY OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT FROM 
INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES, BANGLADESH FY1978-FY1987 
Amount of Credit at 
credit constant 
disbursed FY78 price/* 
------[Mill.Taka]------
1,569 
2,821 
3, 734 
4,238 
6,786 
10,053 
11,498 
6,318 
6,361 
1,569 
2,221 
2,630 
2,632 
3,945 
5,319 
5,449 
2,747 
2,419 
Real Value of Credit 
Per hectare 
of total 
Per hectare 
of HYV land 
cropped area area 
--------[Taka]--------
124 
173 
198 
200 
295 
396 
401 
194 
170 
925 
919 
950 
928 
1,294 
1,685 
1,656 
784 
664 
/* Deflators used to calculate constant prices were computed by using cost of living 
index (general) for middle class people of Dhaka as prescribed in Bangladesh Bank's 
publication "Economic Trends", Jan. 1987, pg. 24. 
/p Provisional. 
Data source: Mahbub Hossain, Fertilizer Pricing Policy and Foodgrain Production 
Strategy in Bangladesh, Vol. 2 Technical Report 1985, pg. 158; Bangladesh Banlt, 
Agricultural Credit Department (July 1987). 
• 
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Annex Tabla D 
DISBURSEMENT AND COLLECTION OF AGRICULTURAL CREDITS, BANGLADESH, FY77-FY87 
[ million taka ] 
Credits \ Yr.and FY77 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 
A. Scheduled banks' outstanding credits 
to agriculture ate. 1,305 8,399 13,515 20,774 30,342 35,143 
In percent of: 
B. All bank credit 11.3 19.8 26.9 31. 7 34.0 32.2 
c. Agr. GDP (preceding year) 2.4 6.9 9.9 12.3 14.5 14.1 
FY78 FY80 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 
FY87/p 
32,719 
FY87/p 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Outstanding Dues 3,422 6,483 8,172 12,402 15,149 
E. Disbursements 1,569 2,821 4,239 6,787 10,053 11,498 
--Long-Term 314 649 1,187 1,968 2,915 
--Short-Term 1,255 2,172 3,052 4,819 7,138 
F. Collections 942 1,475 3,143 3,423 5,176 5,839 
G. Collection Rate/* 43.1% 48.5% 41.9% 41. 7% 38.5% 
/a Excludes FY87 cancelled interest from Ershad's program amounting to Tk. 3.58 million. 
/b Cash recovered (principal+ soma interest). 
/p Provisional at end of year (June 30th) figures. /- Not available. 
/* Recovery as % of demand for recovery CF/D). 
Data source: Bangladesh Bank, Agricultural Credit Department (July 1987); BBS. 
23,752 27,077/a 
6,318 6,361 
6,072 10,987/b 
25.6% 40.6% 
• 
• • .. 
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Annex Table E 
BANK DEPOSITS/*, BANGIADESH, 1975-86 
[ end of June balances in million taka ] 
Growth percentage Average Balance 
Rural Urban Total [%] Ratio of per Branch 
Year [RD] [UD] [TD] Rural Urban RD/TD RD/RB UD/UB 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1975 859 9,323 10,182 0.08 1.2 11.1 
1976 1,063 10,531 11,594 23.7% 13.0% 0.09 1.3 11.1 
1977 1,552 12,901 14,453 46.0% 22.5% 0.11 1.4 13.6 
1978 2,316 15,161 17 ,477 49.2% 17.5% 0.13 1.4 12.9 
1979 3,540 19,391 22,931 52.8% 27.9% 0.15 1.8 15.3 
1980 4,042 24,027 28,069 14.2% 23.9% 0.14 1.6 17 .6 
19-81 5,471 30,291 35,762 35.4% 26.1% 0.15 1.9 19.8 
1982 5,938 32,563 38,501 8.5% 7.5% 0.15 2.0 21.2 
1983 8,544 42,437 50,981 43.9% 30.3% 0.17 2.8 27.3 
1984 12,215 59,369 71,584 43.0% 39.9% 0.17 3.8 37.3 
1985 16,159 77,404 93,563 32.3% 30.4% 0.17 4.8 47.5 
1986 21,038 89,128 110,166 30.2% 15.1% 0.19 6.1 53.4 
/* All scheduled banks. Cooperatives not included. All types of deposits. 
Data source: Z. Ahmed, Rural Finance Project, Aug. 1987 draft report; Bangladesh Bank Bulletin various issues. 
• 
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